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Diversified firms are supposed to be valued less than the sum of their parts because of the 
diversification discount, but subsequent research questioned the causality of the discount. We 
analyze the relationship between diversification and shareholder value taking into 
consideration the persistence of profit over the long term. We offer new insights and a 
complementary view for investors: single-segment firms do not generate more shareholder 
value than diversified firms, and in some situations, the opposite is true. Moreover, we find that 
the relationship between diversification and shareholder value is not causal, but clearly depends 
on the firm’s capacity to generate a long-term, persistently outstanding performance. Finally, 
we demonstrate that in comparison with diversified firms, single-segment firms might be 
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THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE AND DIVERSIFICATION PUZZLE 
 
 
The research domain that attempts to study the relationship between diversification and 
shareholder value has not yet reached definitive and interpretable findings to determine 
whether a diversification strategy creates or destroys value. Research by Lang and Stulz (1994) 
and Berger and Ofek (1995) shows unambiguously that the value of diversified firms is less 
than the sum of its parts. Hence, “on average,” diversification is supposed to destroy value, and 
firms are better off if they remain focused on a single segment in order to maximize 
shareholder value. Subsequent research argues that this relationship is not causal: the discount 
is attributable to factors other than diversification per se (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Graham, 
Lemmon and Wolf, 2002; Villalonga, 2004a). 
All research on the relationship between diversification and shareholder value attempts to 
answer the same research question: is a single-segment better off alone or within the 
conglomerate given the relaxation of financial constraints? This required the analysis to focus 
on explaining whether, on average, diversification destroys or creates value.  
In this research, we do not attempt to answer the specific research question of whether, “on 
average,” diversification is a poor strategy for shareholder value creation using the classical 
“chop-shop” approach. We based our analysis on one particular aspect of the critical empirical 
evidence available in industrial organisation economics and strategic management literature: 
the persistence of outstanding performance. This means that in the long term some firms 
perform better than other firms, independently of whether they are single-segment or 
diversified. We believe that looking for a diversification discount or premium would be an 
extremely relevant indicator if the firm’s performance does not follow any specific pattern over 
time. But because of firms’ long-term performance heterogeneity, finding an average indicator 
of a diversification discount or premium might become irrelevant when studying the 
relationship between diversification and shareholder value, given that over the long term, the 
firms that outperform are almost always the same, and the firms that underperform are almost 
always the same too.  
Because of the long-term performance heterogeneity, our aim therefore in this research is to 
give an additional perspective on the relationship between diversification and shareholder 
value, looking at the tails of the distributions of both single-segment and diversified firms. This 
also suggests that this relationship is not causal and depends on the presence of firm-specific 
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We use the same data and the same selection criteria used in the literature on the diversification 
discount, except that we limit the sample to single-segment and diversified firms with a 
minimum turnover of $500 million in an attempt to separate the firm’s return from the “size 
premium” asked for by investors (Fama and French, 1995). 
First, we construct three performance indicators. Then we calculate the outstanding 
performance for each firm and for each year. An outstanding performance is considered to be a 
performance above its industry average. 
Then we test the persistence of outstanding performance over time using various econometric 
techniques and the Markov conditional probabilities. As assumed, we found an important 
persistence in outstanding performance. We also notice that single-segment firms operate in 
industries with higher growth opportunities compared with diversified firms that seem to be 
considered “value stocks” by investors. 
The persistence of performance heterogeneity over the long term suggests, for consistency 
reasons, that only single-segment firms and diversified firms belonging to the same “performer” 
class should be compared: top performers must be compared with top performers and bottom 
performers must be compared with bottom performers. This provides the opportunity to 
construct several portfolios composed of similar classes of the same performer type for both 
single-segment and diversified firms. Accordingly, we distributed both single-segment and 
diversified firms into quintiles, comparing with each other portfolios of top quintiles and portfolios 
of bottom quintiles. We also compare each type of firm (single-segment and diversified) in the top 
quintile portfolio with similar types of firms in the bottom quintile portfolio in order to gain 
additional empirical evidence of the persistence of outstanding performance over the long term. 
Comparing single-segment and diversified firms using portfolios of firms with similar 
performance characteristics allows us a) to study the relationship between diversification and 
shareholder value from a new perspective, and b) use several techniques in order to measure 
and explain the firm’s return and risk. To measure shareholder value, we calculate the market 
return and Jensen’s alpha for each year and for each portfolio. When we compare the top 
quintiles, we find that single-segment firms show a statistically significant higher performance 
only during two years but have a higher unconditional risk during the entire time series (1999 – 
2006). For the remaining time series, both portfolios show similar returns, but the portfolio of 
single-segment firms indicates a higher unconditional risk. On the other hand, when we 
perform the same analysis for the portfolio of the bottom quintiles, diversified firms clearly 
outperform, with a higher return and a lower unconditional risk than single-segment firms. We 
obtain similar conclusions when we compare the results obtained for Jensen’s alpha. We can 
clearly conclude that from an investor’s viewpoint, diversified firms do not destroy value 
compared with single-segment firms. Moreover, this empirical evidence becomes very strong 
when we compare the portfolio of the top quintile of diversified firms with the portfolio of the 
bottom quintile of single-segment firms: any “expected” diversification discount is not justified. 
Basic statistics indicate that single-segment and diversified firms are different in size and 
operate in different sectors. These differences are certainly included in the return expected by 
investors. Hence, we regress the portfolios of top and bottom quintiles against Fama and 
French’s assets pricing model. We find that the size premium is higher within single-segment 
firms, while diversified firms appear to be “value stocks,” in comparison with single-segment 
firms, which appear to be “growth stocks.”  
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Finally, we further investigate the volatility of the portfolios of single-segment and diversified 
firms, using the daily conditional variance and covariance for each portfolio. We find that, 
independently of the performance group (top or bottom quintiles), single-segment firms show a 
higher volatility, explained by a higher long-term volatility or “sticky” volatility, and also a 
higher degree of reaction to innovation or latest market news. As expected, we find that 
volatility is higher in the bottom quintiles than in the top quintiles. 
This rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next session we briefly discuss related 
literature. Section III describes the data and the sample selection. Section IV describes how we 
calculate the outstanding performance, shows the preliminary results, and finally tests the 
persistence of performance heterogeneity among diversified firms using different econometrics 
techniques and the Markov conditional probabilities. Section V calculates and compares top 
performers and bottom performers among both single-segment and diversified firms according 
to the following indicators: a) the shareholder value in terms of return and unconditional risk; 
b) Jensen’s alpha; c) Fama and French’s three-factor model, and d) the conditional variance and 
covariance. Within each section, the findings are discussed. Finally, Section VI concludes. 
I. Review of the Literature  
The research domain that attempts to study the relationship between diversification and 
performance has not yet reached definitive and interpretable findings to determine whether a 
diversification strategy creates or destroys value. Gains from diversification come from 
economies of scales (Chandler, 1977) or from increased debt capacity (Lewellen, 1971) or from 
exploitation of firm-specific assets in several businesses (Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988). 
Business segments within a conglomerate are supposed to benefit from the internal capital market; 
the headquarters is considered an effective financial intermediary through “winner picking” 
behavior (Williamson, 1975; Stein, 1997): the business segment benefits from higher rights control 
over projects, allowing better information flow, higher assets redeployment, and relaxation of credit 
constraints (Gertner, Sharfstein, and Stein, 1994). These benefits are supposed to offset the internal 
capital market flip-side, identified as the reduction of manager entrepreneurial incentive, the effort 
dilution factor and agency argumentation of on-the-job consumption (Jensen, 1986), in which 
projects receive a lower level of funding than they could obtain standing alone because of cross-
subsidisation, in which high-performing divisions subsidise poor-performing divisions, destroying 
shareholder value (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berg and Ofek, 1995; Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997; 
Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 2000; Sharfstein and Stein, 2000). 
Lang and Stulz (1994), using an industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, and Berg and Ofek (1995) using an 
excess value methodology, attempt to answer the research question: is a business segment 
better off alone or within a conglomerate? This implies looking for an average measurement of 
premium or discount related to the decision to diversify. 
They find that the value of the diversified firms is, “on average,” less than that of a comparable 
portfolio of specialized firms. The diversification discount is explained by the inefficiency of the 
internal capital market: the corporate headquarters does not channel funds to the segments that 
have the best business opportunities. They conclude unambiguously that diversification is not a 
successful path to higher performance because the value of the diversified firm is less than the 
sum of its parts by an average discount factor of 13-15% (Berg and Ofek, 1995).  
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This method of portfolios of specialized firms or “pure play firms” (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berg 
and Ofek, 1995) suffers from a number of drawbacks: as sample selection (Campa & Kedia, 
2002; Villalonga, 2004a), measurement errors, and data artefact related to the construction of 
the excess value methodology (Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf, 2002; Schoar, 2002; Mansi and 
Reeb, 2002; Villalonga, 2004b; Emms & Kale, 2006; Stowe and Xing, 2006). Once these biases 
are corrected, the diversification discount becomes very small or even turns into a premium. 
Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004a) find that the diversification discount was 
explained by endogeneity (diversifying firms are poor performers prior to diversification). 
According to these authors, the relationship between the decision to diversify and firm value is 
not causal, and it depends on the firm’s characteristics: once this bias is corrected, the empirical 
evidence showed that the decision to diversify is a value-enhancing strategy. A key 
fundamental empirical evidence in industrial organization economics and strategic 
management literature is the existence of persistence of superior performance, defined as a 
statistically significant above-average performance relative to a reference set (such as an 
industry) that persists over the long-term (Mueller, 1977; Jacobsen, 1988; Schohl, 1990; 
Waring, 1996; McGahan and Porter, 1999, 2003; Maruyama and Odagiri, 2002; Wiggins and 
Ruefli, 2002, 2005; Yurtoglu, 2004; Bentzen, Strojer Madsen, Valdemart, and Dilling-Hansen, 
2005; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Marinelli, 2008). If the competitive advantage (from a specific 
position in the industry or because of strategic assets) had been sustainable only in the short 
term, it would have triggered a serious reconsideration especially in the field of strategic 
management science. The persistence in firms’ performance is therefore a fundamental 
characteristic to be taken into consideration when studying whether a firm’s diversification 
destroys value compared with firms that remain focused on a single business. 
II. Data and Sample Selection Criteria 
The new segment reporting standard SFAS 131 was issued by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Boards (FASB) in June 1997 and is effective for fiscal years commencing after 
December 15, 1997. According to the SFAS 131, a firm must report disaggregated information 
by business line. In addition, the information provided under the new standard about segment 
definition would be less subjective than what was provided under the previous SFAS 14 and it 
induces companies to disclose their diversification and fund transfer strategies, thereby 
reflecting any underlying agency problem (Berger and Hann, 2003). Previous studies of the 
diversification discount have fixed a lower limit of $20 million in turnover (Berger and Ofek, 
1995; Campa and Kedia, 2002) or $100 million in assets on average (Lang and Stulz, 1994) in 
order to be included in the sample. This implies that the empirical findings from these studies 
do not control for the “size premium” historically received by investors who invest in the stocks 
of companies with a relatively small market capitalisation: small stocks tend to be less 
profitable than large stocks. It was noticed during the 1981-1982 recession that small stocks 
showed a prolonged earning depression and were not able to participate in the boom of the 
middle and late 1980’s. This led to a size-related risk factor for small capitalized firms (Fama 
and French, 1995). Because size directly influences stock returns, we attempt to control for the 
“size effect” by introducing a lower limit of $500 million in turnover in the sample selection 
and removing from the sample all firms that are below this threshold. Compared with previous 
studies of the diversification discount, this choice reduces the sample size but it also allows us 
to attempt to moderate the size premium’s effects on stock returns when we compare diversified 
and single-segment firms. A sample of 611 diversified and single-segment firms with turnovers  
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higher than $500 million was taken from Compustat Industry Segment (CIS) during the period 
1999-2006. 
Within the sample, 317 firms are diversified firms, representing 42% of the population of 
diversified firms with a turnover higher than $500 million during the time series 1999-2006 
and 294 are single-segment firms representing 69.5% of the population of single-segment firms 
with a turnover higher than $500 million during the time series 1999-2006. Because our 
research is based on the empirical evidence of the persistence of “abnormal returns” within both 
forms of firms (single-segment and diversified), we collect data only from firms that remain 
single-segment or remain diversified during the entire time series. In addition, testing the 
persistence of abnormal returns requires balanced panel data; thus, firms missing one or more 
years of data cannot be included in the sample. Although we had to exclude a certain number 
of firms, we were able to obtain 42% of the population of diversified firms and 69.5% of the 
population of single-segment firms, which allowed us to generalize our findings to the entire 
population of diversified and single-segment firms. With this study method, we have introduced 
a survival bias in our sample (i.e. diversified firms that refocus to improve performance and 
single-segment firms that diversify are not taken into consideration).  
The length of this time series (8 years) is justified by the aim of the research question: to 
compare diversified and single-segment firms that remained diversified and single-segment, 
respectively, during the entire time period. A longer time series, e.g. 15-20 years, as used in the 
previous literature on diversification, may increase the self-selection bias effect, especially for 
diversified firms, given that poor-performing diversified firms may choose to refocus on one 
business in order to improve performance (Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988), leaving only 
high-performing diversified firms in the sample. Moreover, the requirement related to balanced 
panel data shortens the time series: a longer time series would have caused difficulties in 
generalising our empirical findings as it would have led to more companies being excluded 
because of missing data. 
To enable a comparison with previous studies in finance, firms belonging to agriculture (SIC 
100-900), regulated industries (SIC 4900-4999), financial services (SIC 6000-6900), depositary 
receipts (SIC 8888), international affairs (SIC 9721), and non-operating establishments (SIC 
9995), are excluded. Diversified firms may not fully allocate accounting items in their reported 
business segments. This lack of consistency in reporting may lead to problems with the use of 
business segment data. Therefore, we have adopted Berger and Ofek’s (1995) convention of 
requiring that the sum of segment sales (assets) be within 1% (25%) of the consolidated firm 
total reported in Compustat. For those firms that meet this criterion, any unallocated assets are 
explicitly allocated to it; for example, if a firm’s assets level is 10% smaller (larger) than the 
sum of the segment assets, each segment’s assets are reduced (increased) by 10%. Moreover, the 
corporate segment data (sales, assets, capital expenditure, operating income and depreciation) 
are allocated to the segments on an asset-weighted basis. These adjustments should mitigate the 
shortcomings highlighted by Berger and Hann (2003) in the use of SFAS 131. Because the 
excess value methodology is not used, as opposed to the literature on finance, firms that have 
segments in the financial industry or in a regulated industry are not excluded but instead just 
that particular segment is excluded from the analysis. Around 25 firms in the sample have 
activities in the financial industry. This financial segment is represented by leasing activities 
and, given the interest spread between diversified firms’ cost of debt and the final lending 
interest, it is assumed that this activity is profitable. Hence, excluding these types of firms may 
introduce a bias in the sample selection given that diversified firms enjoy greater debt capacity,  
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lower cost of debt, and debt tax shield relative to single-segment firms due to lower risk 
(Lewellen, 1971; Mansi and Reeb, 2002). 
III. Identification of Performance Measurements and Test of 
Persistence of Outstanding Performance 
A: Variables 
In order to compare performance of firms with segments in different industries with different 
industry-specific levels of financial performance, the performance indicator used here is the 
outstanding performance (outstanding with the meaning of performance above the industry 
average calculated using data from single-segment and diversified firms). For diversified firms, 
the firm whose sum of the asset-weighted averages of the performance of its segments relative 
to the industry average is positive is considered outstanding. For single-segment firms, its 
performance is compared with the average performance of its industry segment. There are three 
performance indicators: OROA, OSALES/ASSETS, and OOP/SALES, that measure performance in 
the return on assets, operating profits/sales and return on sales relative to industry averages, 
respectively. We construct the following indicators of outstanding performance: 







where ROAjit  represents the ROA of the industry j defined by a 6-digit NAICS code of the 
segment of firm i during period t and ROAindjt represents the asset-weighted average ROA of the 
same industry j during period t. Ajit /Ait represents the portion of the assets of segment j within 
firm i during period t. In order to calculate a consistent benchmark ROAindjt, following the 
previous literature on finance for the calculation of the excess value methodology (Berg and 
Ofek, 1995), at least 5 segments are required with the same industry defined by a 6-digit NAICS 
code. If this condition is not fulfilled, the industry is then defined by a 5-digit NAICS code and 
then by a 4-digit NAICS code until this condition is fulfilled.  
The other two indicators of outstanding performance – the sales/assets ratio and the operating 
profit/sales (ROS) ratio – are constructed applying the same logic as OROAit: 











where SALESindjt/ASSETSindjt represents the asset-weighted average operating profit/sales ratio of 
the same industry j during period t. 








where ROSindjt represents the asset-weighted average ROS ratio of the same industry j during 
period t.  
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Table 1 summarises the descriptive statistics of the three outstanding performance indicators of 
both diversified and single-segment firms. On average, diversified firms slightly underperform 
their industry sectors for all three indicators of outstanding performance compared with single-
segment firms. However, diversified firms seem to have higher average outstanding ROA but 
lower outstanding SALES/ASSETS (OSALES/ASSETS). Table II shows the 15 main industries 
(the 15 most frequent industry segments) for both diversified and single-segment firms. 
Diversified firms seem more concentrated in manufacturing segments (NAICS code 31–33) with 
moderate growth opportunities (average ME/BE, 2.58 and 2.64) while single-segment firms 
seem to be focused on manufacturing segments, wholesale trade and retail segments (NAICS 42 
and 44–45) with higher growth opportunities (average ME/BE, 2.75 and 2.84). When both types 
of firms are compared, it can be concluded that diversified firms seem to operate in more 
mature industries while single-segment firms operate in growth industries.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of performance indicators within single-segment and diversified firms 
 
Three measures of outstanding performance are developed: outstanding ROA (OROA), outstanding SALES/ASSETS and outstanding Operating 
Profit/Sales (OROS). They enable the performance of single-segment and diversified firms in different industries to be compared, assessing whether the 
firm performs below or above their industry average. Here, the average ROA and the average assets were also calculated for the entire sample of 
single-segment and diversified firm as a measurement of the firms’ size. The industry average ROA, SALES/ASSETS, and ROS indicators correspond to 
the equal-weighted average of the industries in which the single-segment and diversified firms operate. 
 
  Diversified firms  Single-segment firms 
  Mean Med  σ  Max. Min.  Mean  Med  σ  Max. Min. 
Assets  8,225 1,905  21,526  265,680  79  4,365 1,721 6,875  63,387  140 
Firm’s  ROA  0.10 0.09 0.09  1.43  -0.55  0.11 0.10 0.08 0.46 -0.40 
Outstanding ROA (ROA)  -0.01  -0.01  0.08  0.73  -0.95  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.66  -0.36 
Outstanding SALES/ASSETS  -0.03  -0.09  0.87  20.12  -4.62  0.07  -0.01  0.81  12.35  -3.66 
Outstanding ROS (OROS)  -0.01  0.00  0.43  3.89  -16.84  0.01  0.00  0.29  6.71  -1.32 
Industry  ROA  0.11 0.10 0.09  1.42  -0.70  0.10 0.10 0.07 0.34 -0.70 
Industry  SALES/ASSETS  1.29 1.12 0.80  14.54 0.09  1.40 1.24 0.87 5.40  0.15 
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Table II 
Descriptive statistics for the 15 most frequent industry sectors (business segments) of single-segment and diversified firms 
This table shows the ranking, description and percentage out of the total of the 15 most frequent industry sectors of diversified firms and single-
segment firms that represent 34.5% and 43%, respectively, of the total number of industries (business segments) during the times series 1999-2006. 
Using the NAICS codes to SIC codes correspondence table, it is possible to allocate each of the 15 most frequent business segments of our sample to 
one of the 48 industry sectors identified by Fama and French. This allow us to obtain the following estimates for the 15 most frequent industry 
sectors: a) the average industry return - value-weighted industry portfolio; b) the average industry return - equal-weighted industry portfolio; c) the 
industry average ME/BE - value-weighted industry portfolio, and d) the industry average ME/BE - equal-weighted industry portfolio. 
  Diversified firms  Single-segment firms 






























Semiconductor and Other 
Electronic Component 
Manufacturing 
  2  3.89%  Basic Chemical Manufacturing  2  4.05%  Oil and Gas Extraction 
 3 
2.94% 
Newspaper, Periodical, Book, and 
Directory Publishers 
3 
4.05% Grocery  Stores 
 4 
2.63% 
Aerospace Product and Parts 
Manufacturing 
4 
3.64% Clothing  Stores 
  5  2.56%  Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mills  5  3.64%  Scheduled Air Transportation 
 6 
2.21% 








Agriculture, Construction, and 
Mining Machinery Manufacturing 
7 
2.43% Automobile  Dealers 
 8 
1.97% 
Resin, Synthetic Rubber, and 




Other General Merchandise 
Stores  
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  9  1.89%  Motor Vehicle Parts Manufacturing  9  2.02%  Beverage Manufacturing 
 10 
1.86%  Support Activities for Mining 
10 
2.02% 
Motor Vehicle Parts 
Manufacturing 
 11 
1.80%  Plastic Product Manufacturing 
11 
2.02% 







2.02% Department  Stores 
 13 
1.61% 
Non-ferrous Metal (except 
Aluminium) Production and 
Processing 
13 
2.02% Full-Service  Restaurants 
 14 
1.58% 












Household and Institutional 
Furniture and Kitchen Cabinet 
Manufacturing 
Industry average return - value-weighted 
industry portfolio 
0.0813 0.0630 
Industry average return - equal-weighted 
industry portfolio 
0.2888 0.2854 
Industry average ME/BE - value-weighted 
industry portfolio 
2.58 2.75 
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B: Test of persistent performance  
To test persistence in performance, first we used an autoregressive model AR (1) such as: 
Yit = α + ßYi(t-1) + (ηi + vit) 
The test was carried out using several econometric techniques. Yit is the observation of the 
performance indicators of firm i in period t, Yi(t-1)is the performance of the previous period, ηi is 
the stochastic unobserved firm-specific time-invariant effect, vit is the error component and α is 
the constant term. The value of β is estimated using different econometric measurements and the 
Hausman test (null hypothesis E[Yitηi] = 0) is performed.  
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Table III 
Autoregressive model AR(1) of persistence of outstanding performance 
To test the persistence of outstanding performance, an autoregressive model AR(1) such as: Yit = α + ßYi(t-1) + (ηi + vit) is used to determine, applying 
various econometric techniques, the value of the autoregressive coefficient β: pooled OLS, Within-Group and the instrumental variables (IV) 2SLS. To 
select the most efficient econometric model, the Hausman test (null hypothesis E[Yitηi] = 0) is used to assess the presence of firm’s time-invariant 
specific effect ηi. The Hausman test indicates whether the Pooled OLS provides a consistent estimate ofβ. 
 
  Entire sample  Single-segment firms  Diversified firms 






















2  0.48 0.47   0.49 0.48   0.48 0.4553   






















2  0.70  0.70    0.682  0.681    0.7661 0.1967  




















2  0.15  0.13    0.511  0.5078   0.0913 0.0568  
Hausman test  χ2= 0.57  χ2= 0.58  χ2= 19.78 
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Table III shows that all the autoregressive models AR(1) give a consistent positive value of 
β that confirms the hypothesis of a persistent performance for all three performance indicators. 
The Hausman test shows stochastic unobserved firm-specific time-invariant effects (ηi) for 
diversified firms, while ηi is only present for the outstanding ROA (OROA) indicator for single-
segment firms. As suggested by Bond (2002) and Arellano (2003), AR(1) through pooled OLS is 
inconsistent and biased upwards since the explanatory variable Yit-1 is positively correlated with 
the error term (ηi + vit) due to the presence of the firm time-invariant specific effect ηi. The 
Within-Group estimator eliminates the sources of inconsistency by transforming the equation 
to eliminate the firm time-invariant specific effect ηi. However, this transformation introduces a 
negative correlation of order 1/(t-1) between the transformed lagged dependent variables and 
the transformed error term, suggesting that, except for time series with t greater than or equal 
to 15 (Arellano, 2003), the Within-Group estimator is biased downwards and therefore is not 
efficient. The correlation between Yit and ηi indicates that the consistent estimation of β is 
represented only by model 3 through the autoregressive first difference Two-Stage Least 
Squared (2SLS) developed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) in which the firm-specific effects are 
eliminated hence the estimator is consistent. For the entire sample and for both single-segment 
and diversified firms, we find strong empirical evidence of a persistence in outstanding 
performance between time t and time t-1. 
 
C. Composition of single-segment and diversified firm classes  
The value of the autoregressive coefficient β confirms the existence of a persistent outstanding 
performance. Due to this empirical evidence, we operate as follows to compare the difference in 
shareholder value between diversified and single-segment firms: firms are ranked according to 
their outstanding performance indicators for every year, classes of quintiles are formed and the 
Markov conditional probability of remaining in the same quintile from time t to t+1 during the 
times series 1999–2006 is calculated. The null hypothesis (absence of persistent outstanding 
performance) would assume that the value for remaining in the same quintile or migrating to 
one of the other quintiles would have been close to 20%. Our results show a persistently 
outstanding performance for all three indicators.   
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Table IV 
Markov conditional probabilities 
An additional measurement of the persistence of outstanding performance is the conditional Markov probabilities. For all indicators of outstanding 
performance, and during each year of the time series 1999-2006, all single-segment and diversified firms are sorted into performance quintiles and the 
Markov conditional probability that indicates that a firm will either stay in the same performance quintile, or move into one of the other four quintiles 
in the following year (t+1) is determined. For the hypothesis H0 (absence of persistence of outstanding performance), the Markov conditional 
probabilities would have been around 20%, which indicates that at time (t+1) a firm has the same probability of staying in the same quintile as it does 
of moving into one of the lower or upper quintiles. For the hypothesis H1 (existence of a persistence of outstanding performance between time t and 
time t+1), the value of the Markov conditional probability would be different from 20%.  
Diversified Firms  Single-segment firms 
Outstanding ROA (OROA) 




















Top Quintile  63  20    8    3    5  Top Quintile  62  22  8  5  3 
II  Quintile  21 40 23 10     6  II  Quintile  22 44 22     7     5 
III Quintile    8  26  32  23  10  III Quintile    8  20  38  27    8 
IV Quintile    3    9  26  40  22  IV Quintile    4    9  25  38  24 
Bottom 
Quintile 
  4    5  12  26  52  Bottom 
Quintile 
  4    5    8  23  59 
Outstanding OSALES/ASSETS 




















Top Quintile  73  17    5    1    4  Top Quintile  76  16    4    2    2 
II Quintile  19  45  24    8    4  II Quintile  17  55  21    5    2 
III Quintile    4  26  42  23    4  III Quintile    3  20  48  25    5 
IV Quintile    4    9  23  47  17  IV Quintile    2    6  22  50  20 
Bottom 
Quintile 
  2    3    8  21  65  Bottom 
Quintile 
  2    3    6  19  70 
Outstanding OROS 




















Top Quintile  62  17    7    8    5  Top Quintile  76  16    4    2    2 
II Quintile  22  42  22    8    6  II Quintile  17  55  21    5    2 
III Quintile    5  23  40  22    9  III Quintile    3  20  48  25    5 
IV Quintile    4  10  24  42  20  IV Quintile    2    6  22  50  20 
Bottom 
Quintile 
  7    6  10  21  56  Bottom 
Quintile 
  2    3    6  19  70  
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The null hypothesis is rejected for all three performance indicators: diversified firms in the top 
(and bottom) quintile have at least a 52% chance of remaining in those quintiles and at most a 
7% chance of moving to the bottom (and top) quintile, while single-segment firms in the top 
(and bottom) quintile have at least a 59% chance of remaining in those quintiles and at most a 
4% chance of moving to the bottom (and top) quintile. In addition, we observe that the top and 
bottom quintiles show higher probabilities of remaining in the same quintile compared with the 
second, third and fourth quintiles: i.e., for the indicator outstanding ROA (OROA) within 
diversified firms, the probability of the top and bottom quintiles remaining in their quintile is 
63% and 52%, respectively, while for the second, third and fourth quintiles, this percentage is 
40%, 32% and 40%, respectively. We find similar figures for the two indicators of outstanding 
performance. The Markov conditional probabilities confirmed the previous findings using 
econometric techniques: for both single-segment and diversified firms, there is a significant 
persistence of outstanding performance for all performance indicators. Firms that outperform 
during time t have a high probability of outperforming during time t+1 and firms that 
underperform during time t have a high probability of underperforming during time t+1. This 
empirical evidence provides the basis for our research and strengthens our hypothesis that the 
use of average indicators to estimate the creation or destruction of shareholder value in relation 
to diversification strategies might not be the appropriate measurement for solving this specific 
research question.  
Because of the persistence of outstanding performance, we do not compare shareholder value 
creation or market performance between diversified and single-segment firms using the excess 
value methodology introduced by Berg and Ofek (1995) and commonly used in finance 
literature. We estimate shareholder value and market performance between diversified and 
single-segment firms in the same class. We therefore compared the top and bottom quintiles of 
diversified firms with the top and bottom quintiles of single-segment firms. This classification 
of similar “performers” into quintiles also allows us to compare top quintiles of diversified firms 
with top quintiles of single-segment firms, giving investors an additional investment 
perspective based on the empirical evidence of the persistence of outstanding performance 
within both single-segment and diversified firms.  
We intend to form and compare portfolios with the shares of firms that belong to the 
distributions’ tails and persistently remain in that particular distribution tail during the time 
series 1999-2000. We find a significant persistence of outstanding performance for all three 
outstanding performance indicators, OROA, OSALES/ASSETS, and OROS. We form portfolios 
(one portfolio contains shares of the firms belonging to the top quintile and the other portfolio 
contains shares of the firms belonging to the bottom quintile) for both diversified and single-
segment firms, based on the ranking obtained from the OROA performance indicator. We use 
the OROA indicator because of its higher correlation against firm’s Tobin’s q (firm’s Tobin’s q is 
defined in the literature as a well-accepted index of firm’s performance) compared with 
OSALES/ASSETS and OROS, as shown in Table V.  
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Table V 
Simple regression between outstanding performance indicators and Tobin’s q 
In order to select the more appropriate performance indicators to construct portfolios of top and bottom quintiles, each indicator of outstanding 
performance is regressed against Tobin’s q for the entire times series 1999-2006. The table gives the simple correlation coefficients between OROA, 







Single-segment firms  Diversified firms 
 OROA  OSALES/ASSETS  OROS  Tobin’s 
q 
 OROA  OSALES/ASSETS  OROS  Tobin’s 
q 
OROA  1       OROA  1      
OSALES/ASSETS  0.1009 1      OROS  0.1352 1     
OROS  0.0425 0.0013  1    OROS  0.0646 0.0028  1   
Tobin’s q  0.1828 0.0802 0.0752  1  Tobin’s 
q 
0.2248 0.0840 0.0878  1  
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Finally, in order to further confirm the persistence of outstanding performance using the OROA 
indicator, for every year (2000-2006), we calculate the percentage of firms in the quintiles 
formed in 1999 that remain within the top and bottom quintiles, respectively, during the entire 
times series 1999-2006, Table VI. The top quintile group, for both diversified and single-
segment firms, is composed of at least 50% of the firms until 2004. For the last two years of 
this series, the firms in the top quintile during 1999 compose at least 40% of the top quintile 
groups. We can also see that the firms that were in the top quintile in 1999 always represent at 
least 65% of the top and second quintiles in the following year. Within the bottom quintiles, we 
see a stronger persistence of underperformance (negative outstanding performance) for single-
segment firms: the firms that comprise the bottom quintile in 1999 account for almost 50% of 
the bottom quintile during each period during the time series 1999-2006. For diversified firms, 
we see a lower persistence of underperformance than single-segment firms. In this case, the 
firms that comprise the bottom quintile in 1999 account for a percentage between 42% and 
57% of the bottom quintile during each period during the time series 1999-2006. Finally, we 
also see that single-segment firms always represent at least 67% of the top and second quintiles 
in the following year, while the percentage is lower for diversified firms, at 56%.  
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Table VI 
Migration analysis throughout the time series of firms comprising the top and bottom quintiles in 1999 
As an additional measurement of the persistence of outstanding performance, for each year and for each top and bottom quintile, we calculate the 
percentage of the quintile composition, starting in the year 2000, composed of the firms that formed the top and bottom quintile, respectively, in the 
year 1999 (the beginning of our time series). In other words, we want to estimate how the group of firms that comprised every year the top and bottom 
quintile change every year with respect to the group formed in 1999. We perform this analysis for single-segment and diversified firms only taking 
into consideration the OROA as indicator of outstanding performance given that we find that this particular indicator has a higher correlation 
coefficient with Tobin’s q compared with the other two indicators of outstanding performance, OROS and OOP/SALES. 
Diversified Firms  Single-segment firms 
TOP Quintiles OROA (%) 
  Top Quintile  II Quintile  III Quintile  IV Quintile  Bottom 
Quintile 
  Top Quintile  II Quintile  III Quintile  IV Quintile  Bottom 
Quintile 
1999  100       1999  100      
2000  65 22  5  5  2  2000  53 24  5  4  13 
2001  55 24 12  4  4  2001  57 22 10  6  5 
2002  50 24 12  2  9  2002  58 23 12  5  2 
2003  50 29  6  8  7  2003  55 23  8  10  4 
2004  53 27 12  6  2  2004  50 19 13 14  4 
2005  45 24 16  8  6  2005  46 21 11 11 11 
2006  41 24 10 16  8  2006  50 17  8  13 12 
BOTTOM Quintiles OROA (%) 
  Bottom 
Quintile 
IV Quintile  III Quintile  II Quintile  Top Quintile    Bottom 
Quintile 
IV Quintile  III Quintile  II Quintile  Top Quintile 
1999  100       1999  100      
2000  57 29  4  5  5  2000  67 16 11  4  2 
2001  47 16 21  7  9  2001  55 15 11 10  9 
2002  50 19 13 15  3  2002  54 15 15  6  9 
2003  52 15 13 15  5  2003  51 20 11  4  13 
2004  43 18 19  7  13  2004  49 21 12 21 17 
2005  47 19 17 11  5  2005  48 18 14  4  16 
2006  43 13 19 15  9  2006  51 14 12  4  17  
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IV. Shareholder Value, Market performance and Risk for Single-
segment and Diversified Firms 
As previously emphasized, our research does not focus on average measurement of value 
creation or destruction in relation with diversification. Using empirical evidence on the persistence 
of outstanding performance, we can calculate and compare shareholder value through the market 
performance of equal-valued share portfolios of firms belonging to the same quintile. We compare 
shareholder value between diversified and single-segment firms by a) comparing the market 
performance (returns, unconditional risk, and Jensen’s alpha), and b) attempting to explain the 
returns’ differences using the assets pricing model of Fama and French and the conditional risk 
(conditional variance and covariance). We perform this analysis for every year and for each 
portfolio of top and bottom quintiles of single-segment and diversified firms. Moreover, in 
order to confirm the persistence of outstanding performance found at accounting data level, we 
also test whether this persistence in outstanding performance is also reflected at market data 
level. Hence, we also compare the difference between the top and bottom quintiles among 
diversified and single-segment firms. For every year, four equally balanced portfolios (1$ 
invested in each firm) are constructed and the return to shareholders is evaluated. The 
portfolios are constructed according to the OROA indicator of performance: the first portfolio 
with firms that belong to the top quintile of diversified firms, the second portfolio with firms 
that belong to the bottom quintile of diversified firms, the third portfolio with firms that belong 
to the top quintile of single-segment firms and the fourth portfolio with firms that belong to 
the bottom quintile of single-segment firms.  
A. Risk and total return 
For each portfolio and for every year,  the portfolio’s total return and standard deviation (σ) are 
calculated as a measurement of the unconditional risk. Table VII shows the results. Except for 
2003 (the year of recovery after the recession in 2002), where performance across the top and 
bottom quintiles and across firms is statistically similar, we do not find any pattern of market 
underperformance among diversified firms compared with single-segment firms, as would be 
suggested by previous literature on the “diversification discount.” When comparing top 
quintiles, we noticed that single-segment firms have a statistically significantly higher stock 
return than diversified firms only in two years (1999 and 2001), but this performance is related 
to a higher unconditional risk. In the remaining five years, single-segment firms show a 
statistically significantly higher unconditional risk than diversified firms but with a similar 
market performance. When we compare the difference in performance in the bottom quintile 
between single-segment and diversified firms, it is clearly seen that diversified firms outperform 
single-segment firms with a higher return and a lower risk. Furthermore, when we compare the 
top quintile of diversified firms and the bottom quintile of single-segment firms, it is clearly 
seen that diversification creates more shareholder value than single-segment firms. Finally, 
comparing the difference between top and bottom quintiles among diversified and single-
segment firms, we confirm the classes of top and bottom performers found through accounting 
data in the previous part. Thus, the persistence of outstanding performance is also confirmed 
using market data.  
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Table VII 
Shareholder value of top and bottom quintiles of diversified and single-segment firms: total return, and standard deviation 
Daily market data, for each year and for each portfolio of top and bottom quintiles of single-segment and diversified firms, are used to calculate the 
total return and the total unconditional risk (the standard deviation σ). Daily market data are taken from Thomson Financial and the total return has 
been taken into consideration. Panel A shows the yearly return and conditional risk for the four portfolios: top quintile single-segment firms, top 
quintile diversified firms, bottom quintile single-segment firms and bottom quintile diversified firms. Panel B shows the difference in yearly returns 
and its statistical significance at 95% (t statistics indicated in brackets), and the difference in unconditional risk and the statistical significance (p value) of the 
inequality of the standard deviations (σ). The difference is calculated a) between portfolios of different quintiles (top quintile compared with bottom quintile) 
for both single-segment and diversified firms, and b) between portfolios of similar quintile types but with different firm classes (single-segment firms 
compared with diversified firms).  
Panel A 
Top quintile single-segment firms (%)          
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Return 35.16  15.85  23.26  -11.21  33.48  18.86  13.50  19.41 
Unconditional risk (σ) 17.62  23.29  25.35  24.24  17.73  14.01  12.08  13.61 
 
Top quintile diversified firms (%)          
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Return 16.06  11.97  11.82  -6.76  37.53  23.07  14.65  19.60 
Unconditional risk (σ) 11.23  17.98  16.14  16.96  13.18  10.55  12.55  14.61 
 
Bottom quintile single-segment firms (%)          
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Return 8.08  -27.78  1.79  -39.40  37.54  6.37  -12.91  1.71 
Unconditional risk (σ) 16.10  22.51  22.51  24.74  39.86  15.33  13.05  14.55 
 
Bottom quintile diversified firms (%)          
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Return 2.41  -13.67  -0.27  -26.64  40.11  12.75  -8.11  11.64 
Unconditional risk (σ) 12.56  16.39  19.18  22.59  16.96  14.37  13.36  14.86  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 21 
Table VII (continued) 
 
Panel B 
Difference in return and risk between top quintiles of single-segment firms and diversified firms (%) 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
19.1  3.88  11.44  -4.45  -4.05  -4.21  -1.15  0.19  Difference in Total Return 
(6.11)  (0.93)  (2.66)  (1.04)  (1.27)  (1.69)  (0.47)  (0.06) 
Difference in Unconditional risk (σ) 6.39*  5.31**  9.21*  7.28*  4.55**  3.46**  -0.47  -1 
Difference in return and risk between bottom quintiles of single-segment firms and diversified firms (%) 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
5.67  -14.11  2.06  -12.76  -2.57  -6.38  -4.8  -9.93  Return 
(1.75)  (3.36)  (0.48)  (2.58)  (0.42)  (2.14)  (1.75)  (3.14) 
Unconditional risk (σ) 3.54  6.12**  3.33  2.15  22.9*  0.96  -0.31  -0.31 
Difference in return and risk between top and bottom quintile of diversified firms (%) 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
13.65  25.64  12.09  19.88  -2.58  10.32  22.76  7.96  Difference in Total Return 
(5.34)  (7.63)  (3.46)  (4.92)  (0.85)  (4.22)  (8.87)  (2.55) 
Difference in Unconditional risk (σ) -1.33  1.59  -3.04  -5.63*  -3.78***  -3.82**  -0.81  -0.25 
Difference in return and risk between top and bottom quintile of single-segment firms (%) 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
27.08  43.63  21.47  28.19  -4.06  12.49  26.41  17.7  Difference in Total Return 
(7.20)  (8.61)  (4.20)  (5.35)  (0.64)  (4.06)  (10.08)  (5.92) 
Difference in Unconditional risk (σ) 1.52  0.78  2.84  -0.5  -22.13*  -1.32  -0.97  -0.94 
Difference in return and risk between top quintile of diversified firms and bottom quintile of single-segment firms (%) 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
7.98  39.75  10.03  33.14  -0.01  16.7  27.56  17.89  Return 
(2.60)  (9.14)  (2.48)  (6.92)  (0.00)  (6.22)  (10.52)  (5.78) 
Unconditional risk (σ) -4.87**  -4.53**  -6.37**  -7.78*  -26.68*  -4.78**  -0.5  0.06 
*p< 0.01, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.10.   
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B. Jensen’s alpha  
Jensen’s alpha (Jensen, 1969) measures the systematic risk-adjusted excess return with respect 
to a selected reference market according to the formula: 
 
Rp – Rf= βp (Rm-Rf) + Alpha 
 
Αlpha = Rp – βp (Rm-Rf) - Rf 
 
Rp represents the return of the top and bottom quintile portfolios, Rf is the risk-free rate, Rm is 
the market return and βp is the covariance of the portfolio’s returns scaled by the variance of 
the return on the market.  
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Table VIII 
Jensen’s alpha of the top and bottom quintiles in diversified and single-segment firms  
Daily market data, for each year and for each portfolio of top and bottom quintiles of diversified and single-segment firms, are used to calculate 
Jensen’s alpha in order to compare the financial performance with a market reference. Daily market data are taken from Thomson Financial and the 
total return has been taken into consideration. Jensen’s alpha is calculated according to the following formula: Αlpha = Rp – βp (Rm-Rf) – Rf, where 
Rp represents the return of the top and bottom quintile portfolio, Rf is the risk-free rate, Rm is the market return and βp is the covariance of the 
portfolio’s returns scaled by the variance of the market return. The S&P 500 Composite index has been taken as reference market (market index). 
The correlation between the market index and the portfolio is shown in brackets.  
 
Top quintile single-segment firms (%) 
  1999 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
















Top quintile diversified firms (%) 
  1999 2000  2001 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
















Bottom quintile single-segment firms (%) 
  1999  2000 2001  2002 2003 2004  2005  2006 
















Bottom quintile diversified firms (%) 
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It can be seen from Table VIII that the performance of the two top quintile portfolios is similar 
to that found in the risk and return analysis: we found that single-segment firms show a superior 
performance from 1999 to 2002. For the remaining period, diversified firms show a slightly higher 
Jensen’s alpha. Unlike the bottom quintile portfolios, the portfolio composed of diversified firms 
clearly shows a higher Jensen’s alpha than the portfolio of single-segment firms, which clearly and 
consistently underperforms the market. As in the previous analysis (return and unconditional 
risk), we do not find any consistent evidence that single-segment firms outperform diversified 
firms. Within the top quintiles, single-segment firms’ superior performance is only clearly 
present during the first four years, while during the rest of the time series the opposite is the 
case. Compared with the bottom quintiles, we found evidence that the of bottom quintile 
portfolio of diversified firms clearly outperforms the portfolio of single-segment firms, which 
clearly underperforms the market in seven years out of eight.  
We also confirm the persistence of outstanding performance within single-segment and 
diversified firms found in the previous section: Jensen’s alpha between the top quintile 
portfolios and the bottom quintile portfolios is always positive and significant; within single-
segment firms, this difference is very important. Moreover, the top quintile portfolios always 
beat the market during the years when the bottom quintile portfolios underperform the market. 
 
C. Fama & French three-factor model 
The basic statistics have shown two important differences between single-segment firms and 
diversified firms, which are included in the expected return: a) single-segment firms have a 
smaller size than diversified firms, and b) single-segment firms compete in industries with 
higher ME/BE multiples than diversified firms. We therefore analyse whether these specific 
characteristics of single-segment and diversified firms might explain the difference in returns 
using Fama and French’s asset pricing model to explain the portfolio’s extra return (the 
portfolio’s return minus the risk-free rate) taking into account the extra return or “risk 
premium” that investors ask for with respect to a “size premium” and “value premium”, in 
addition to the premium related to the systematic risk.  
Fama and French’s multifactor asset pricing model was grounded on the empirical finding that 
size (SMB) and the book-to-market equity ratio (HML) have a consistent, significant 
explanatory power for stock returns (Fama and French, 1992). 
The Fama and French three-factor model follows this formula: 
Rp = Rf + bi(Rm-Rf) + siSMB +hiHML 
Where: 
Rm-Rf factor: Market premium, equal to the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964). This measurement allows 
the systematic risk known as the market risk, or the risk that cannot be diversified away and is 
not specific to individual stock to be compared for both portfolios.  
SMB factor: This stands for Small Minus Big, and accounts for the “size premium”. It is also 
conditionally related to profitability (Fama and French, 1992). It is designed to measure the 
additional return that investors have historically received by investing in stocks of companies 
with a relatively low market capitalization. Logically, this factor would be expected to be more 
sensitive to a large number of risk factors due to their relatively undiversified nature and their  
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reduced ability to absorb negative financial stock. Fama and French (1992) observe that the 
1981-1982 recession turns into a prolonged earning depression for small stocks and also that, 
on average, small stocks do not participate in the boom of the middle and late 1980’s. 
HML factor: This stands for High Minus Low and accounts for the “value premium.” It is more 
related to profitability than the SMB factor (Fama and French, 1992). It is designed to measure 
the additional return provided to investors by investing in companies with high book-to-market 
values. Fama and French (1995) show that book-to-market equity and the slope on HML proxy 
for relative for distress: weak firms with persistently low earnings tend to have a high BE/ME 
(book equity/market equity ratio) and a positive slope on HML, while strong firms with 
persistently high earnings have a low BE/ME and a negative slope on HML.  
We regress each top and bottom quintile for both single-segment and diversified firms against 
the Fama and French three factors. We also regress the difference in returns between these 
portfolios within the same quintile class. 
Table IX shows the results.  
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Table IX 
Regression of top and bottom quintile returns against the Fama and French three-factor model 
The daily return of the top and bottom quintile portfolios of diversified and single-segment firms is regressed against the Fama and French three-factor model 
according to the formula (Rp-Rf) = α + bi(Rm-Rf) + siSMB +hiHML. Rm is the return on the value-weighted index of NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks on day t; Rft 
is the beginning-of-month three-month T-bill yield on day t, SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return on large firms on day t, and HMLt is the return on 
high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks on day t. The factor definitions are described in Fama and French (1993). 
The regression is performed for every year and for the entire time series 1999-2006. The daily difference in return between the top quintile portfolios 
(single-segment firms minus diversified firms) and the bottom quintile portfolios is also regressed in the same way (for each year and for the entire 
time series) against the Fama and French three-factor model, according to the formula (∆Rp-Rf) = α + bi(Rm-Rf) + siSMB +hiHML, where the term ∆Rp 
is the difference in return between portfolios. T-statistics are in brackets. Panel A contains the results of the regressions for the top quintiles, Panel B 
contains the results of the regressions for the bottom quintiles, and Panel C contains the results of the regressions between the top and bottom 
quintiles of single-segment and diversified firms.  
Panel A: Top Quintiles 
Top quintile single-segment firms (yearly) 
Coefficients   1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
R
2
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Table IX (continued) 
 
Top quintile diversified firms (yearly) 
Coefficients   1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
R
2  0.51 0.65 0.80 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.91 0.84 
































































Top quintile diversified firms (1999-2006) 
R  0.76 
b(Market)  0.0083 
(73.16) 
s(SMB)  0.0036 
(21.82) 
h(HLM)  0.0048 
(24.62) 
α  0.00026 
(2.65) 
Difference top quintiles single-segment and diversified firms (yearly) 
Coefficients   1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
R  0.38 0.31 0.40 0.45 0.21 0.11 0.19 0.09 
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Table IX (continued) 
 
 
Difference top quintiles single-segment and diversified firms (1999-2006) 
R
2  0.27 
b(Market)  0.0017 
(10.78) 
s(SMB)  0.00021 
(0.95) 
h(HLM)  -0.0032 
(12.43) 
α  0.0001 
(0.57) 
Panel B. Bottom Quintiles 
 
Bottom quintile single-segment firms (yearly) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

































































Bottom quintile single-segment firms (1999-2006) 
R  0.47 
b(Market)  0.0094 
(35.70) 
s(SMB)  0.0054 
(13.98) 
h(HLM)  0.0039 
(8.49) 
α  -0.0006 
(2.72)  
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Table IX (continued) 
 
 
Bottom quintile diversified firms (yearly) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
R  0.61 0.55 0.69 0.84 0.77 0.82 0.67 0.81 
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Table IX (continued) 
 
Difference bottom quintiles single-segment and diversified firms (yearly) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
R  0.07 0.15 0.18 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.06 
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Table IX (continued) 
 
Panel C: Difference between top and bottom quintiles  
 
Difference between top and bottom quintiles within diversified firms (yearly) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
R
2  0.07 0.05 0.11 0.24 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.04 

































































Difference between top and bottom quintiles within diversified firms (1999-2006) 
R  0.05 
b(Market)  -0.0011 
(7.25) 
s(SMB)  -0.0013 
(5.72) 
h(HLM)  -0.0020 
(7.52) 
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Table IX (continued) 
 
 
Difference between top and bottom quintiles within single-segment firms (yearly) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
R  0.22 0.10 0.12 0.05  0.009 0.02 0.03 0.09 

































































Difference between top and bottom quintiles within single-segment firms (1999-2006) 
R  0.04 
b(Market)  0.0047 
(1.69) 
s(SMB)  -0.0016 
(3.86) 
h(HLM)  -0.0022 
(4.73) 
α  0.0008 
(3.44)  
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In Panel A, we analyse the top quintile portfolios formed by single-segment firms and 
diversified firms. For both single-segment and diversified firms, the yearly regression suggests 
high value and statistical significance in the regression coefficients and an intercept which is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero except for 2001 for single-segment firms and 2004 and 
2005 for diversified firms, but is economically indistinguishable from zero for the entire time 
series. This indicates that the Fama and French model’s risk factors are able to capture the 
difference in performance within these two classes of firms.  
The value of the coefficients bi and si, related to the market (Rm-Rf) and the size (SMB) 
premiums, respectively, are higher and statistically significant within single-segment firms. 
Over the entire time series 1999-2006, investors ask for higher returns from single-segment 
firms in relation to a) their market volatility, and b) their smaller size compared with diversified 
firms. On the other hand, the value of the coefficient h related to the value premium (HML) is 
higher and statistically significant within diversified firms. Over the entire time series 1999- 2006, 
investors ask for higher returns from diversified firms because they are considered “value 
stock,” given their relatively higher BE/ME ratio in comparison with single-segment firms. We 
obtain similar results when we regress the difference (ΔRp) between single-segment and 
diversified firms. 
In Panel B, we analyse the bottom quintile portfolios formed by single-segment and diversified 
firms. When we analyse the coefficient related to all three factors, we find similar results as in 
Panel A, except for the intercept, which is statistically not indistinguishable from zero even 
though it is economically not significant. This indicates that the risk factors of the Fama and 
French model are able to capture some of the difference in performance within these two 
classes of firms but something remains unexplained.  
When we regress the portfolios’ return difference (ΔRp), we obtain confirmation of the result 
found in panel A for the difference in the top quintile. However, for the bottom quintile, the 
Fama and French model shows a low correlation R
2
Adj, most likely because of the high scatter, 
which gives a different interpretation to the results of this specific regression. In Panel C, we 
regress the difference between the top and bottom quintiles of single-segment and diversified 
firms (ΔRp) with respect to the Fama and French model. The correlation coefficient R
2
Adj 
obtained is not very representative. The regression coefficients in Panels A and B of the top and 
bottom quintiles (both single-segment and diversified firms) show a consistent, statistically 
significant difference: the top quintile shows a consistently lower risk, lower size and lower 
value premium when we regress the portfolio’s returns with respect to the Fama and French 
model. 
We conclude from the regression of the portfolio’s returns with respect to Fama and French’s 
assets pricing model that investors in single-segment firms ask for higher market and size 
premiums but a lower value premium, while investors in diversified firms ask for lower market 
and size premiums but a higher value premium. Over the entire time series 1999-2006, 
investors ask for higher returns from diversified firms because they are considered to be “value 
stock,” given their relatively higher BE/ME ratio compared with single-segment firms. Finally, 
when we compare the coefficient between top and bottom quintiles within single-segment and 
diversified firms, respectively, we can state from Panel A that the top quintiles have a lower 
coefficient value related to the risk factors. The Fama and French three-factor model also 
confirms the persistence of outstanding performance found previously. 
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D. Risk measurement: conditional variance and conditional covariance 
Previous findings have shown that once the empirical evidence of the persistence of abnormal 
return is taken into consideration, the widely held concept that, “on average,” diversified firms 
destroy value is not confirmed. Moreover, when the Fama and French assets pricing model is 
applied, we find that an important part of the difference in return between single-segment and 
diversified firms is explained by the three Fama and French risk factors: the market factor, the 
size factor and the value factor. We go further in this direction in order to find other factors 
that might explain the difference in return between single-segment and diversified firms. Here, 
we analyse more carefully the risk related to the top and bottom quintile portfolios. From Table X, 
the descriptive statistics of the portfolio return distributions, we see that the daily unconditional 
volatility is lower within the portfolios of diversified firms: for the top quintiles, we have a 
coefficient σ of 0.0091compared with 0.012, and for the bottom quintiles, we have a coefficient 
σ of 0.010 compared with 0.014. These results assume that the returns follow a normal 
distribution but, as we can see, this is not the case. As can be seen form the distribution 
parameters and the return distribution histogram (Figure 1), the returns do not follow a normal 
distribution: all distributions have a fat tail (kurtosis higher than 3) and, except for the bottom 
quintile of diversified firms (negatively skewed), the other portfolios are positively skewed 
instead of 0. As expected, top quintiles have higher average returns than bottom quintiles, 
given the empirical evidence of the persistence of outstanding performance. 
 
Table X 
Distribution and basic statistics of returns   
The table shows the mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, maximum and minimum of 
the daily returns for the top and bottom quintile portfolios of single-segment and diversified 
firms. We can see that the distribution of returns is not normal for all cases: a normal 
distribution implies zero skewness (symmetric distribution) and kurtosis equal to 3 (normal 
peakiness, not fat tails).  













µ 0.0006182  -0.0002478  0.0006211  -0.0000234 
σ 0.01202  0.0142569  0.0091273  0.0104531 
Skewness 0.0421655 0.000356  0.0061088  -0.1537581 
Kurtosis 5.642445  105.1802  4.177992  4.83263 
Max. 0.0632829  0.2616302  0.0428319  0.0522806 
Min. -0.0881613  -0.2495758  -0.0430556  -0.057147 
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Figure 1 



















Conditional variance using the NGARCH (1,1) model 
Because of the non-normality of the return distribution, we cannot estimate the risk related to 
the portfolios through the daily unconditional variance σ. We need to estimate the daily 
conditional variance. We also estimate the daily conditional covariance (the dynamic beta) with 
respect to the Standard & Poor 500 market index (the same reference market used to calculate 
Jensen’s alpha).  
The NGARCH (1,1) model describes the dynamic behavior of the conditional variance, following 
the formula: 
σt





in which w is the long-term variance γVL (a sort of unconditional variance), γ is the weight 
assigned to the long-term variance, α is the weight of the volatility related to the innovations 
of latest news at day t-1, and β is a weight of the previously estimated conditional variance of 
the persistence of volatility, with the condition that  . 1 = + + β α γ The parameter θ is the 
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Return distribution single segment firms – top quintile 
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asymmetric parameter given that negative returns due to bad news increase the variance rate 
more than positive returns of the same magnitude. This is also known as the “leverage effect,” 
since a decrease in the asset’s price reduces the company’s market value relative to the debt’s 
market value, and therefore the debt/equity ratio also increases.  
Table XI and Figure 2 show the results. It can be seen that the daily volatility within single-
segment firms (both top and bottom quintiles) is mainly explained by the long-term volatility 
part of the equation γVL (w), and especially by the parameter γ, which is 0.871 and 0.662 within 
single-segment firms compared with 0.003 and 0.0254 within diversified firms, but also by the 
long-term volatility σL  which is 0.0163 and 0.018 respectively within single-segment firms 
compared with 0.013 and 0.0088 within diversified firms. These figures are confirmed by the 
value of the parameter β, which measures the persistence of the volatility σt-1: 2.008E-08 and 
almost 0 within single-segment firms compared with 0.924 and 0.885 within diversified firms, 
although the volatility of single-segment firms reacts to a greater degree to the news at t-1 with 
a coefficient α of 0.12 and 0.33 compared with 0.048 and 0.031 for diversified firms. The value 
of the persistence of volatility at t-1 according to the formula is very low for single-segment 
firms (0.12 and 0.33) and much higher for diversified firms (0.996 and 0.0947). Finally, we find 
that single-segment firms have a lower “leverage effect” than diversified firms, supposedly 
because of the negative value of the skewness, while the bottom quintile of diversified firms 
shows the highest “leverage effects.” As supposed, we find a negative sign for the correlation ρ 
between news and conditional variance. Finally, we confirm that within each group of 
diversified and single-segment firms, the top quintile has less volatility than the bottom 
quintile.  
When we look at the graph, we see that, during the entire time series 1999-2006, single-
segment firms have higher volatility than diversified firms. This is especially evident when we 
compare the conditional volatility between top quintiles and between bottom quintiles. To 
conclude, single-segment firms have a significantly higher volatility; this volatility is mainly 
explained by a long-term volatility or “sticky” or structural volatility and reacts to a greater 
degree to the latest news and market news than diversified firms. 
 [α (1+ θ) +β]  
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Table XI 
Parameters of the daily conditional variance model NGARCH (1,1)  
The NGARCH (1,1) model describes the dynamic behavior of the conditional variance, 
determining its value at each specific time as a function of its value one day before, the value 
of the (squared) innovations one day before, the long-term average variance and the “leverage 
effect.” The latter effect is explained by the fact that negative returns due to the arrival of bad 
news increase the variance rate more than positive returns of the same magnitude.  
The formula of the conditional variance is: 
σt





The term (1,1) indicates that the conditional variance is based on the most recent observation of 
the squared return, and the most recent estimate of the variance rate (both lags = 1). This 
asymmetric NGARCH specification assigns weights to the (squared) returns depending on 
whether the return is negative or positive. Thus, it incorporates the previously mentioned 
asymmetric effect. The approach used is again the maximum-likelihood method, which implies 
selecting values for the parameters that maximize the chance (or likelihood) of the data 

















1 ) ( , where vi is the daily variance, and 
R
2
i is the daily observation (Ri- R)
2 or the daily square of the innovation of return. For the first 
observation of the conditional variance, we used the unconditional variance of the sample’s 
returns. In all cases α + β < 1; this is required for a stable NGARCH (1,1). Otherwise, the weight 












w  0.000233698  0.000236209 6.59938E-07  1,97962E-06 
α  0.123194519  0.334646615 0.048231232  0,031227521 
β  2.00893E-08  0.00000001 0.924727671  0,885953901 
Parameter 
estimates 
θ  0.215959224  0.089951788 0.694384884  1,35496899 
γ 0,87105987  0.66264564  0.00378543  0.02548669 
VL 0,000268292  0.000356463  0.000174337  0.000076727 
σL 0,016379621  0.018880235  0.01320366  0.008813214 
ρ -0,62854419  -0.42075958  -0.840827129  -0.76161194 
Persistence (σt-1) 0,12894013  0.33735436  0.99621457  0.97451331 
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Figure 2 




















Difference between single-segment firms and diversified firms 

























































Conditional volatility single segment firms – bottom quintile 
 
Conditional volatility diversified – top quintile 
 
Conditional volatility diversified firms – bottom quintile 
 
Difference in conditional variance – bottom quintiles  
 
Difference in conditional volatility – top quintiles  
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Conditional covariance using the GARCH (1,1) model 
We also use the GARCH (1,1) model to estimate the conditional covariance (β) between the top 
and bottom quintiles (both single-segment and diversified firms) with the S&P 500 index as 
well as the variance of each portfolio in order to estimate the conditional β. 
The conditional covariance is estimated with the formula: 
Covt = ω +α R1t−1 − R2t−1 () + βCovt−1 
The conditional variance of each portfolio is estimated with the formula: 
σt








Figure 3 shows the results. We notice that the top quintiles, whose conditional β ranges from 
0.5 to 1.5, have a lower conditional β than bottom quintiles, whose β ranges from 0.5 to 2. 
When we compare single-segment firms with diversified firms, we see for top quintiles that 
single-segment firms have a higher conditional covariance than diversified firms, especially 




Conditional covariance using GARCH (1,1) 
We also use the GARCH (1,1) model to estimate the conditional covariance between the top and 
bottom quintiles (both single-segment and diversified firms) using the S&P 500 index to 
estimate the conditional beta.  
The conditional covariance is:  () () ( ) 1 1 2 1 1 − − − + − + = t t t t Cov R R w Cov β α  where α is the 
coefficient related to the shock effect (or effect on innovation) βis the coefficient related to 
covariance persistence between the portfolio and the S&P 500 index, and with the long-term 
covariance according the following formula:  () . / β α ω − − 1 The maximum likelihood method 
is used to estimate the conditional beta. This implies selecting values for the parameters that 
maximize the chance (or likelihood) of the data occurring according to the following formula: 
 




i is the daily observation (Ri-R )
2 or the daily square of the innovation of return, and 
t 2 1
2
, ρ is the square of the correlation coefficient between innovations obtained by determining 
the daily covariance between the portfolio and the S&P 500 index from the product of the daily 
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The graphs below show the daily beta for each portfolio as well as the difference in the daily 
beta between top and bottom quintiles. The unconditional beta is the ratio β =  . /
2
































































































Conditional covariance single segment firms – bottom quintile 
 
Conditional covariance diversified firms – bottom quintile  
 
Conditional covariance diversified firms – top quintile  
 
Difference in conditional covariance – bottom quintiles  
 
Difference in conditional covariance – top quintiles  
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VI. Conclusion and Direction for Future Research 
Based on the empirical evidence in industrial organisation economics and strategic 
management literature concerning the persistence of outstanding performance, we offer new 
insights and an additional view of the relationship between shareholder value and 
diversification. We do not find that single-segment firms generate more shareholder value than 
diversified firms. Moreover, when we analyse the group of bottom performers, the opposite is 
true: diversified firms generate higher shareholder value than single-segment firms. Investors 
in single-segment firms expect an additional return related to their smaller size, while investors 
in diversified firms expect an additional return because they view these diversified firms as 
“value stocks” in comparison with single-segment firms. In addition, when we compare the 
volatility of single-segment and diversified firms, we clearly find that single-segment firms are 
much more volatile. Their daily volatility is mainly explained by their long-term or “sticky 
volatility” and reacts more strongly to the latest news than diversified firms. We do not attempt 
to answer the classical research questions in finance of whether a business segment is better off 
within a diversified firm or whether, “on average,” single-segment firms create more value than 
diversified firms. Instead, we measure shareholder value and other characteristics based on the 
empirical finding of a substantial persistence of outstanding performance, we confirm that from 
an investor’s perspective, diversified firms are able to create shareholder value and beat the 
market index with lower volatility. Hence, we do not find any argument in favour of a 
diversification discount. 
The results of this research indicate that the relationship between diversification and 
shareholder value is not causal, but rather that it clearly depends on the firm’s capacity to 
generate a long-term persistence of outstanding performance. Future research should be 
oriented towards developing additional indicators both at management and diversification 
strategy levels in order to test what portion of the explanation of the outstanding performance 
pattern of diversified firms resides within the firm’s strategy and management capabilities.  
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